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Abstract
Unemployment rates in developed countries have recently reached levels not seen
in a generation, and workers of all ages are facing increasing probabilities of losing
their jobs and considerable losses in accumulated assets. These events likely increase
the reliance that most older workers will have on public social insurance programs,
exactly at a time that public ﬁnances are suﬀering from a large drop in contribu-
tions. Our paper explicitly accounts for employment uncertainty and unexpected
wealth shocks, something that has been relatively overlooked in the literature, but
that has grown in importance in recent years. Using administrative and household
level data we empirically characterize a life-cycle model of retirement and claiming
decisions in terms of the employment, wage, health, and mortality uncertainty faced
by individuals. Our benchmark model explains with great accuracy the strikingly
high proportion of individuals who claim beneﬁts exactly at the Early Retirement
Age, while still explaining the increased claiming hazard at the Normal Retirement
Age. We also discuss some policy experiments and their interplay with employment
uncertainty. Additionally, we analyze the eﬀects of negative wealth shocks on the
labor supply and claiming decisions of older Americans. Our results can explain
why early claiming has remained very high in the last years even as the early retire-
ment penalties have increased substantially compared with previous periods, and
why labor force participation has remained quite high for older workers even in the
midst of the worse employment crisis in decades.
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11 Introduction and Motivation
Developed countries share a considerable concern about the ﬁnancial sustainability of
their social insurance systems. The origin of these worries can be found on two well
documented processes: an unfavorable demographic performance (see Diamond 2007,
and Lutz et al. 2008), and a tendency towards reducing the age of retirement on those
economies (see Gruber and Wise 1999 and 2004, and Fenge and Pestieau 2005). The
former process has not improved in the last few years, especially in Europe, despite
growing immigration, but the latter shows some signs of being aﬀected by the recent
trend, especially in the United States, towards higher labor force participation by older
individuals. Moreover, the economic turbulence and uncertainty of the last couple of
years has become an additional source of ﬁnancial pressures on governments as their tax
revenues decline, while the reliance on their public systems is now more prominent than
ever.
At the same time the current crisis has aﬀected the labor market in ways not seen in
a generation, with workers of all ages and in almost all occupations suﬀering an increase
in the probability of losing their jobs and a decline in their re-employment probabilities,
exactly at the time that their retirement portfolios where declining sharply. In fact,
in the last two years the U.S. unemployment rate has doubled, and even now aﬀects
around 9% of the labor force after reaching 10% during 2010. Interestingly, in the largest
European economies, which have traditionally suﬀered from higher unemployment rates,
the increases have been more moderate, with the exception of Spain, where unemployment
also more than doubled in this period and is taking a long time to level oﬀ. Additionally,
in the U.S. households portfolios have suﬀered considerably through the recession, and
between 2007 and 2009 the average household wealth decline by around 20% (Bricker
et al. 2011). All this has motivated economists and policy makers to explore the links
between the incentives set up by a wide variety of social insurance programs and retirement
behavior, but rarely have they analyzed the implications of employment uncertainty at
the end of the working life at a time of negative wealth shocks. This is clearly more
important now than ever given the large increases in uncertainty we have seen in the last
couple of years.
Thus, recent retirement trends in the U.S. can be understood as the result of two
forces, the decrease in retirement savings account balances due to the ﬁnancial crisis, and
increasing employment uncertainty due to the deteriorating labor market. These forces
could be in some sense be described as opposite but actually hide some complexities due
to the relationship between labor supply and claiming behavior. The drop in wealth
balances is likely to induce workers to postpone retirement in the sense of working longer,
and the second one is likely to induce them to claim beneﬁts as early as possible and
2at the same time maybe withdraw from the labor force earlier. As noted, for example,
by Coile and Levine (2010) it is hard to tell which one is going to dominate in terms
of the eﬀect on labor supply, and therefore it is imperative to be able to analyze the
question in a setting (which we propose in this paper) in which we can keep one of these
eﬀects (uncertainties) constant to be able to provide a useful analysis.1 The fact is that
in the last few years we have seen both a trend towards higher labor force participation of
older Americans somewhat slowed down by the crisis, as well as a consistent majority of
Americans claiming beneﬁts early, which supports the idea that there are complex eﬀects
at work that are worth analyzing within a framework that can separate claiming and
labor supply decisions.
We explicitly consider the participation decision and job search activities of older indi-
viduals, accounting for employment uncertainty, by using a sequential decision structure.
We consider that older individuals make participation decisions comparing the utility they
receive from retirement beneﬁts today, with the expected utility from continuing active in
the labor market. This participation decision, however, is subject to employment uncer-
tainty. If the likelihood of returning to the labor market after a period of unemployment is
low and the depreciation of expected retirement beneﬁts is high, individuals will be more
prone to choose to start receiving beneﬁts as early as possible. Note that if the probability
of becoming unemployed is ignored, the expected utility from work is overestimated and,
hence, the probability of applying for beneﬁts, especially at early ages, is underestimated.
This mechanism, as employment uncertainty has evolved over time, can explain part of
the striking shift of beneﬁts claim from the Normal Retirement Age to the Early Retire-
ment Age in the United States, and also the fact that this early claiming has remained
high even as the penalty for early retirement has become steeper with the increases in the
Normal Retirement Age that started in the year 2000, and that will continue later in the
decade.
Social Security provides fairly complex incentives that aﬀect the labor supply and
beneﬁt uptake behavior of individuals between the Early Retirement Age (ERA) and
the maximum retirement age. These incentives, analyzed in detail in the Appendix, are
especially involved between the early and Normal Retirement Ages (NRA). In the U.S.,
two of the most important incentives are the Social Security Earnings Test (ET), which
determines the maximum level of earnings that do not result in a beneﬁt reduction for
individuals who have claimed retirement beneﬁts before the NRA, and the Actuarial
1Coile and Levine (2010) discuss it in the following terms “... it is diﬃcult to know what impact
the current economic crisis may have on retirement behavior. Decreases in retirement savings account
balances and home equity reduce available income in retirement and may indeed lead some to stay in the
workforce longer. At the same time, a weak labor market may lead to job losses and limit opportunities
for older workers who are seeking jobs. Their only option may be to retire. Both delayed retirement for
some and earlier retirement for others may result.”
3Reduction Factor (ARF), which determines the permanent reduction in beneﬁts that
individuals face if they claim beneﬁts early. However, the role of the Earnings Test in
the context of the adjustment of the ARF is not very well understood, or even known by
many. We will show through our dynamic model that the appropriate modeling of these
incentives is key in order to understand the claiming behavior of older Americans.
The model used in this paper is closely related to those presented in Rust and Phelan
(1997), Ben´ ıtez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003 and 2011), and Ben´ ıtez-Silva and Hei-
land (2007). Our model also shares a number of characteristics with the work of French
(2005), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), Blau (2008), and Iskhakov (2010), among
other researchers who solve, simulate, and in some cases estimate, dynamic retirement
models under uncertainty. The importance of modeling in detail the incentive structure
related to early retirement and claiming behavior has been convincingly emphasized by
Ben´ ıtez-Silva and Heiland (2007, 2008), and Ben´ ıtez-Silva et al. (2009). These researchers
are the ﬁrst to explain in the US context the trend towards early claiming, which has been
documented using administrative micro data in Ben´ ıtez-Silva and Yin (2009). However,
even in those complex models the authors ignore employment uncertainty, and assume a
perfect control by the individual over its labor supply. The price to pay for not consid-
ering the employment uncertainty is that the expected utility from continue to work is
overestimated, and the probability of claiming early or applying for disability beneﬁts is
underestimated. Chan and Stevens (2004), and Coile and Levine (2007, 2010) discuss the
importance of taking into account employment uncertainty when analyzing retirement
programs, but they do it within a reduced form context in which the discussion of possi-
ble reforms to the system is not meaningful, given that they do not explicitly model the
behavior of the individuals or the incentives faced by them.
We therefore contribute to the vast retirement literature by paying special attention to
employment uncertainty and, even more importantly, its interplay with social insurance
programs in the United States. In fact, lack of consideration of employment uncertainty
may lead to biased estimates of the eﬀects of potential reforms of the pension system. By
carefully modeling employment uncertainty in a life-cycle model of retirement behavior,
we correctly assess the trade-oﬀs that individuals face when deciding whether to claim
beneﬁts early, and whether to drop from the labor force. The risk of unemployment
is very important for older workers, whose productivity and grade of adequacy to new
technologies tend to depreciate rapidly with time. Hence, if we ignore the ﬁring risk of
older workers, we would be overestimating the utility workers derive from the option of
continue working and, on the contrary, under-estimating the option of exiting earlier from
the labor market to retirement. Moreover, as it has been emphasized by Garc´ ıa-P´ erez
(2006), the consideration of the likelihood of dismissal makes unemployed workers change
their search behavior as their expected stage in unemployment is longer.
4Our paper also contributes to the literature on search models by considering non-
participation decisions in a non-stationary environment including the risk of dismissal.
The possibility of non-participation in an otherwise standard search model was ﬁrst an-
alyzed in Pissarides (1976) and in Van den Berg (1990). More recently, Frijters and
van der Klaauw (2006) estimate an structural, non-stationary search model with non-
participation, where the state of inactivity (considered as an absorbing one) is unrelated
to the economic conditions. Our analysis improves upon the former by considering the
fundamental non-stationarity induced by age considerations, and upon the latter by pro-
viding a full economic description of the non-participation state (i.e., retirement). Fur-
thermore, we include in this literature the risk of dismissal, and one of the few existing
research about this issues is Garc´ ıa P´ erez and S´ anchez-Mart´ ın (2010), where a search
model with a full economic description of the non-participation state is developed. The
main novelty of the present paper with respect to the latter is the explicit consideration
of saving decisions by workers.
In this paper we provide a partial equilibrium simulation exercise using calibrated
parameter values. Most of these calibrated parameters are the result of extensive reduced
form econometric models which have explored in detail the descriptive properties of the
data. Some other parameters like the discount factor and the relative risk aversion param-
eters are taken from recent studies using similar models (See, Gourinchas and Parker 2002,
and French 2005). The model is able to explain with great accuracy the beneﬁts claiming
behavior of older Americans; namely, the strikingly high proportion of individuals who
claim beneﬁts exactly at the ERA. The model is also able to replicate the increased hazard
of applying for beneﬁts at the NRA. The model does a good job in capturing the declin-
ing labor force participation at those same ages, and shows that both claiming and labor
supply are responsive to employment uncertainty and the level of unemployment bene-
ﬁts. Another important ﬁnding is that it is key to model uncertainty properly, otherwise
claiming hazards at age 62 (65) are underestimated (overestimated) by as much as 10%
(25%), labor supply at age 62 is overestimated by around 10%, and wealth accumulation
in the 60s is also overestimated by almost 10% if employment uncertainty is ignored.
We then analyze the eﬀects of a number of policy experiments and their interplay with
employment uncertainty, and ﬁnd that labor supply can be quite responsive to certain
policies that make work at older ages comparatively more attractive, like reductions in the
Social Security taxes paid by older workers, and especially (with double digit increases in
labor supply at certain ages, and an increase in the average working life of almost 2 years,
as well as a move towards even earlier claiming) increases in the average wage used to
compute retirement beneﬁts for those that work in their 60s and beyond. Additionally, we
conclude from our benchmark model as well as all the policy simulations, that accounting
for uncertainty (moving from no uncertainty to regular uncertainty more clearly, and
5then to high uncertainty) leads to higher early claiming and slightly lower labor force
participation. Given the unemployment probabilities we have calculated from the CPS,
the 56% increase in unemployment probabilities around age 62 (going from an average
3.2% probability of losing their jobs in a given year to about 5%) that occurred in 2008-
2009 compared with the historical 1986-2006 trend, leads to an increase in early claiming
of 4%, and a decrease in labor force participation of 4.6%.2
Finally, we analyze the eﬀects of a sudden and unexpected drop in wealth balances (in-
spired by the drops in household wealth reported in the SCF 2009) on retirement, keeping
employment uncertainty constant. This eﬀort is related to a number of empirical eﬀorts
trying to understand whether retirement behavior responds to business cycle ﬂuctuations,
as discussed for example in Hurd, Reti, and Rohwedder (2009). We ﬁnd that negative
wealth shocks have a positive and fairly large eﬀect on labor supply (except exactly at
the Early Retirement Age mark), and induce earlier beneﬁts claiming. The labor supply
eﬀect we predict is somewhat larger than previously shown, in part due to the fact that
most researchers have ignored the role of employment uncertainty over the business cycle,
which comes to oﬀset the eﬀect of wealth shocks on labor supply, and biases wealth eﬀects
in standard reduced form models towards zero.
The combination of the eﬀects we ﬁnd that higher employment uncertainty and neg-
ative wealth shocks have on labor supply and claiming, can explain why early claiming
has remained very high in the United States even as the early retirement penalties have
increased substantially compared with previous periods, and why labor force participa-
tion has remained quite high for older workers even in the midst of the worse employment
crisis in a generation.
The structure of the paper is the following. After presenting the basic stylized facts
regarding retirement and claiming behavior in the U.S. in Section 2, we describe our life-
cycle model in Section 3. In Section 4 we present our simulation results, and Section 5
describes the policy experiments we propose and their budgetary consequences. Section
6 analyzes the eﬀects of wealth shocks on the key variables of interest, and Section 7
concludes.
2While the responsiveness of claiming and labor supply to changes in unemployment probabilities
might seem small given the large proportional jump in uncertainty during the latest recession, if analyzed
from the point of view of employment uncertainty, the responsiveness is much larger. Notice that the
historical probability of being (voluntary) employed (given employment in the previous period) was
around 96.8% and it changed to around 94.95%. This means that a drop of only around 1.91% in
employment probabilities, resulted in changes in claiming and labor supply of twice that magnitude.
62 Stylized facts regarding retirement
The large retirement literature developed during the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S. focused
on explaining the connection between retirement incentives and retirement behavior.3 It
concluded, quite convincingly, that the retirement peaks at age 62 and age 65 could be
explained if the full set of incentives were included in the model. However, in the data
used in those studies the majority of Americans were claiming beneﬁts at age 65, while in
the 1980s and 1990s the peak started to move towards age 62. By the end of the 1990s,
around 60% of older Americans were claiming beneﬁts at age 62, and it has stayed at that
level, even with the implementation of the 1983 Amendments that penalize early claiming
of beneﬁts, and reward late claiming at a higher rate, along with the substantial increase
in expected longevity since the 1970s. In fact, as of the end of 2009, 71.86% of men
and 74.69% of women claimed Social Security beneﬁts before the Normal Retirement Age
(NRA), compared to 36% and 59% in 1970, respectively.4 Clearly, the economic incentives
seem to be insuﬃcient to achieve the objective of prolonging average work lives, given the
strong correlation between beneﬁt claiming and labor supply.
As it is clearly shown in Table 1, using data from Table 6.A4 of SSA’s Statistical
Supplement, the take-up of retirement beneﬁts at the earliest possible age has become
prevalent in the U.S. economy. The peaks are at the eligibility ages of 62 and 65 which
comes as no surprise given this well established response to program incentives. Between
1994 and 2005, almost 60% of claimants have been taking their beneﬁts at age 62 (between
51% and 54% in the 2006-2009 period), and between 15% and 20% wait for the normal
age of retirement (between 22% and 26% in 2006-2009). A majority of the remaining
individuals claim at age 63 or 64, with a very small proportion claiming after the NRA.
The latter is worth emphasizing given that the Delayed Retirement Credit increased by
half a percentage point every two years during this period.5
It is interesting to notice the rather anomalous claiming behavior in 2000, which re-
sulted in an increase in claiming at age 65, and a reduction of the proportion of individuals
claiming at 62. This is driven by the large increase in new entitlements at age 65 and
above in that year, very likely the product of the removal of the ET for those above
3For a survey of this broad retirement literature see Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999). Hurd (1990),
Lumsdaine (1995), and Ruhm (1996) provide good discussions of the earlier literature.
4See the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin (2009), Table 6A4, and also
the Social Security Bulletin, OASDI Monthly Statistics, 1970 - 2007. The latter statistics are no longer
available but are comparable to the ones given in the Statistical Supplement.
5Using the ﬁrst seven waves of the Health and Retirement Study, we see that the claiming distribution
is quite similar to those reported, which is not surprising given that the HRS cohort reached retirement
claiming ages exactly in the period covered by Table 1. 55% of the HRS cohort claimed at 62, 12.32%
at age 63, 8.48% at age 64, 16.71% at age 65, 3.41% at age 66, and 3.7% at age 67 or above. We do not
use the HRS data as our benchmark in the discussion, because in a number of waves it is not possible
to separate retirement claiming from other type of Social Security claiming, like disability beneﬁts or
survivor beneﬁts.
7the NRA, which made waiting to claim beneﬁts because of a strong attachment to the
labor force unnecessary. This conjecture is further supported by the evidence on beneﬁts
levels shown in the bottom panel of this table. It shows the trends in beneﬁts received,
in dollars of 2005, as a function of the age at which beneﬁts where claimed. We see a
clear break in the patterns after 2000, especially in terms of the beneﬁt levels at the NRA
and above. In 1999 and 2000 later claiming led to consistently larger beneﬁts, while the
maximum beneﬁt has been systematically obtained by those claiming at 65 since then. It
drops sharply for those claiming after 65, potentially because those individuals are now
of a type trying to catch up to compensate for a low wage career, or a sketchy one. Our
interpretation of this evidence is that the removal of the ET for those above the NRA
had the eﬀect of allowing people to claim beneﬁts independently of their labor supply
behavior, leading relatively well-oﬀ individuals, who before waited to claim to avoid the
ET, to claim sooner. Those claiming after the NRA are now either individuals trying to
catch up after relatively lower wage career proﬁles, or spouses claiming on their partner’s
earnings histories. Notice that the scheduled increases in the NRA are essentially bringing
back the old ET for those above age 65, so the prediction is that a pre-ET-reform beneﬁt
level distribution is likely to emerge, at least in part, in the next years. It is important to
emphasize that this table does not account for the actuarial reduction of beneﬁts faced
by individuals claiming before the NRA, or for the delayed retirement credit obtained by
those after the NRA. In this research we are interested in the inﬂation-adjusted level of
beneﬁts actually received by claimers since this is what our dynamic model of retirement
predicts.6
Table 2 is similar to Table 1 but now we are not using the Annual Statistical Sup-
plement, but a Public-Use microdata extract from the Master Beneﬁciary Record. This
public data provided by Social Security allows us to overcome a problem with the previous
table; namely, that we could not separate individuals who claim on their own histories
of earnings (workers) from those who claim as dependents. With the microdata we can
do that, and in this new table we restrict attention to male workers, who represent the
closest empirical counterpart of the agents in our dynamic model. The main diﬀerence
with the trends shown in Table 1, which includes data for all individuals claiming, is that
claiming is somehow lower at age 62 and larger at age 65-66. An additional diﬀerence
between these two tables is that now the average beneﬁts we show are adjusted by the
Actuarial Reduction Factors and the Delayed Retirement Credit, which essentially mean
that those beneﬁt levels are now actuarially comparable and an approximation to the
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), instead of being in nominal terms like those in the
6It is clear that analyzing the role of (theoretically) actuarially fair adjustments is important to
understand the importance of individual heterogeneity in claiming behavior. Ben´ ıtez-Silva and Yin
(2009) focus on this point, and ﬁnd considerable individual heterogeneity in beneﬁts receipt, especially
for those above the NRA.
8previous table. We have made the adjustments to show the striking trend in (actuarially
adjusted) beneﬁts in the last few years, in which the level of beneﬁts of those receiving
beneﬁts early has increased while the level of those claiming late has decreased quite
sharply. Ben´ ıtez-Silva and Yin (2009) discuss this interesting issue in detail, arguing that
has much to do with the elimination of the Earnings Test and the increases in the NRA.
Our model will provide an empirical counterpart to the beneﬁt levels shown in Table 1.
In Table 3 we present the main stylized facts regarding labor supply of older workers,
according to data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) in the 1996-2006 period.
Firstly, it is quite remarkable that part-time is very stable at all ages: around 12-14% of
them are observed working part-time (deﬁned as working less than 35 hours per week).
This fact likely reﬂects the considerable self-selection and labor demand factors that inﬂu-
ence the possibility of working part-time, which makes quite challenging to try to match
this within our model without relying on some ad-hoc assumption about part-time of-
fer arrival rates which are hard to justify on empirical grounds. It is also important to
note that the fraction of people working full-time at age 60+ has increased considerable
(especially for those over 61) in the 10 years we present here, which corroborates the
aggregate evidence that labor force participation of older workers is on the rise. Finally,
the fraction of those not working increases substantially at age 62 and reaches 70% after
age 67. More aggregate data, that from BLS, shows a similar and very interesting picture,
for both males and females. The labor force participation rate for older Americans has
been growing since the mid 1990s. The share of males aged 55-64 in the labor force has
increased from 65.5% percent in 1994 to 70.2% percent in 2009 after three decades of
decline. This is mainly driven by males aged 60-64, for whom participation rates have
risen from around 52% to around 61% during that period. Notice that these are exactly
the individuals who become eligible to claim retirement beneﬁts, and are claiming them
predominantly early. At the same time, for males 65 and over the participation rate has
also increased substantially, from close to 17% to around 22%. For females the participa-
tion rate has continuously increased in the last three decades, from around 40% in 1980
(48.9% in 1994) to 60% in 2009.
Our model relies heavily on a number of empirical speciﬁcations, for example regarding
health uncertainty, and the evolution of average wages. For the former we use the ﬁrst
six waves of the HRS, which cover the 1992 to 2002 period of the US economy. The
HRS is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of 7,700 households headed by an
individual aged 51 to 61 as of 1992-93. The primary purpose of the HRS is to study the
labor force transitions between work and retirement with particular emphasis on sources
of retirement income and health care needs (see Juster and Suzman 1995). The way we
approximate average wages is explained in the following section.
93 Methodology and the Dynamic Model
We solve and simulate an extended version of the Life-Cycle model, in which individuals
maximize expected discounted life-time utility, which in this case depends on consumption
and leisure, and individuals face some of the key incentives from social insurance programs,
such as retirement incentives, and unemployment insurance. We formally acknowledge
that individuals face several sources of uncertainty, including life-time, wage, health, and
employment uncertainty. The latter is one of the keys of our model, since individuals
know that as they grow old, and their productivity declines, the probability of losing
their jobs might be increasing. This can have a sizable eﬀect on how they assess the
beneﬁts provided by early retirement provisions, and even disability beneﬁts.
3.1 Model description and assumptions
We assume that individuals maximize the expected discounted stream of future utility,
where the per period utility function u(c,l,h,t) depends on consumption c, leisure l,
health status h, and age t. We specify a utility function for which more consumption is
better than less, with agents expressing a moderate level of risk aversion. The ﬂip side of
utility of leisure is the disutility of work. We assume that this disutility is an increasing
function of age. It is also higher for individuals who are in bad health and lower for
individuals with higher human capital (measured by the average wage). In addition, we
assume that the worse an individual’s health is, the lower their overall level of utility
is, holding everything else constant. Moreover, we assume that individuals obtain utility
from bequeathing wealth to heirs after they die. This model assumes that individuals are
forward looking, and discount future periods at a constant rate β, assumed ﬁxed in our
calibration exercises, and equal to 0.96. Individuals can accumulate balances and receive
a ﬁxed interest rate of 2%.7
We solve the dynamic life-cycle model by backward induction, and by discretizing
the space for the continuous state variables.8 The terminal age is 100 and the age when
individuals are assumed to enter the labor force is 21. Prior to their 62nd birthday, agents
in our model make a leisure and consumption decision in each period. At 62 and until age
70, individuals decide on leisure, consumption, and application for retirement beneﬁts,
denoted flt,ct,ssdtg, at the beginning of each period, where lt denotes leisure, ct denotes
consumption, which is treated as a continuous decision variable, and ssdt denotes the
individual’s Social Security beneﬁt claiming decisions. We assume two possible values for
ssdt. If ssdt equals 1 the agent has initiated the receipt of beneﬁts. If the individual has
7Table A.1. in the Appendix shows a summary table with the values we use for the key parameters
we use in the paper.
8See Rust (1996), and Judd (1998) for a survey of numerical methods in economics.
10not ﬁled for beneﬁts or is not eligible then ssdt is equal to 0.
After age 70 it is assumed that all individuals have claimed beneﬁts, and again only
consumption and leisure choices are possible. Leisure time is normalized to 1, where lt = 1
is deﬁned as not working at all, lt = .543 corresponds to full-time work, and lt = .817
denotes part-time work. These quantities correspond to the amount of waking time spent
non-working, assuming that a full-time job requires 2000 hours per year and a part-time
job requires 800 hours per year.
The model allows for four diﬀerent sources of uncertainty: (a) lifetime uncertainty:
modeled to match the Life Tables of the United States with age and health speciﬁc survival
probabilities; (b) wage uncertainty: modeled to follow a log-normal distribution function
of average wages as explained in more detail below; (c) health uncertainty: assumed to
evolve in a Markovian fashion using empirical transition probabilities from a variety of
household surveys, including the NLSY79 and the HRS. And ﬁnally (d) Employment
uncertainty: modeled following the empirical distributions using the CPS from 1989 to
2006. We will also use data on the 2008-2009 period to approximate the eﬀect on the
employment transition probabilities of the current economic crisis.
Given that we allow for employment uncertainty and therefore the possibility of losing
a job, it is quite important to model unemployment beneﬁts, which in the United States,
and until the current economic crisis, covered individuals during 26 weeks, and at a level
of approximately 80% of their previous wage. We will model the latter as a function of
the average wage of the individual, which in our framework plays the role of a permanent
income measure.
The state of an individual at any point during the life cycle can be summarized by
ﬁve state variables: (i) Current age t; (ii) net (tangible) wealth at; (iii) the individual’s
Social Security beneﬁt claiming state sst; (iv) the individual’s health status, and (v) the
individual’s average wage, wt. This average wage is a key variable in the dynamic model,
serving two roles: (1) it acts as a measure of permanent income that serves as a convenient
suﬃcient statistic for capturing serial correlation and predicting the evolution of annual
wage earnings; and (2) it is key to accurately model the rules governing payment of the
Social Security beneﬁts. In the U.S., an individual’s highest 35 years of earnings are
averaged and the resulting Average Indexed Earnings (AIE) is denoted as wt. The PIA
is the potential Social Security beneﬁt rate when retiring at the NRA. It is a piece-wise
linear, concave function of wt, whose value is denoted by P(wt).
In principle, one needs to keep as state variables the entire past earnings history
for the computation of wt. To avoid this, we follow Ben´ ıtez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust
(2011) and approximate the evolution of average wages in a Markovian fashion, i.e., period
t + 1 average wage, wt+1, is predicted using only age, t, current average wage, wt, and
current period earnings, yt. Within a log-normal regression model, we follow Ben´ ıtez-Silva,
11Buchinsky, and Rust (2011), such that:
log(wt+1) = γ1 + γ2 log(yt) + γ3 log(wt) + γ4t + γ5t
2 + ϵt. (1)
The R2 for this type of regression is very high, with an extremely small estimated standard
error, resulting from the low variability of the fwtg sequences. This is a key aspect of the
model given the important computational simpliﬁcation that allows us to accurately model
the Social Security rules in our dynamic programming model with a minimal number of
state variables.
We then use the observed sequence of average wages as regressors to estimate the
following log-normal regression model of an individual’s annual earnings:
log(yt+1) = α1 + α2 log(wt) + α3t + α4t
2 + ηt. (2)
This equation describes the evolution of earnings for full-time employment. Part-time
workers are assumed to earn a pro-rata share of the full-time earnings level (i.e., part-
time earnings are, say, 0.8  800/2000 of the full-time wage level given in equation (2)).
The factor of 0.8 here incorporates the assumption that the rate of pay working part-time
is 80% of the full-time rate. We actually use data from the CPS in the 1996 to 2006
period to estimate this part-time penalty.9
The advantage of using wt instead of the actual Average Indexed Earnings, especially
in the U.S., is that wt becomes a suﬃcient statistic for the person’s earnings history.
Thus we need only keep track of wt, and update it recursively using the latest earnings
according to (1), rather than having to keep track of the entire earnings history in order
to determine the 35 highest earnings years, which the AIE requires.
3.2 The model




+ ϕ(t,h,w)log(l)   2h, (3)
where h denotes the health status and ϕ(t,h,w) is a weight function that can be inter-
preted as the relative disutility of work. We use the same speciﬁcation for ϕ and the
disutility from working as in Ben´ ıtez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2011).
The disutility of work increases with age, and is uniformly higher the worse one’s
9Given the relatively small number of part-time workers at some ages, we had to aggregate across
a wide range of ages. Interestingly the penalty decreases with age, likely due to self-selection. For
individuals younger than 61 the penalty for part-time work is almost 40%, then decreases to about 25%
for those between 61 and 64, and ﬁnally declines to around 20% for those 65 and older.
12health is. If an individual is in good health, the disutility of work increases much more
gradually with age compared to the poor health states. The disutility of work decreases
with average wage. We postulate that high wage workers, especially highly educated
professionals, have better working conditions than most lower wage blue collar workers,
whose jobs are more likely to involve less pleasant, more repetitive, working conditions
and a higher level of physical labor.
We assume that there are no time or ﬁnancial costs involved in applying for retirement
beneﬁts. The parameter γ indexes the individual’s level of risk aversion. As γ ! 0
the utility of consumption approaches log(c). We use γ =  .37, which corresponds
to a moderate degree of risk aversion, i.e., implied behavior that is slightly more risk
averse than that implied by logarithmic preferences. This speciﬁcation has been used and
discussed by Ben´ ıtez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2003, 2011), and also in Ben´ ıtez-Silva
and Heiland (2007).
Thus, the expected present discounted value of utility from age t onward for an in-
dividual with state variables (a,w,ss) where a stands for assets, is represented by the
following two Bellman equations that correspond to the core of the model we are analyz-
ing. We separate the value of being employed and the value of being unemployed. One of
the keys of the model is that we are adding the probability of losing a job to a dynamic
life cycle model of consumption, asset accumulation and retirement.














L = L(1   I) + I
at+1 = (1 + r)(at   ct) + wt(1   I) + IPt (5)










13L = L(1   I) + I
at+1 = (1 + r)(at   ct) + bt(1   I) + IPt (7)
As explained before, unemployment beneﬁts, bt, are computed as a function of the
average wage, with ﬁring costs being the equivalent of two weeks pay, and unemployment
beneﬁts worth half of 80% of the previous period average wage. Thus, we deﬁne:
bt = g(wt,dt) (8)
The function EVt+1(a,w,ss,c,l,ssd,h) in each of the two labor status denotes the
conditional expectation of next period’s value function, given the individual’s current

















where the number of Social Security states, n, is eighteen for the United States, once we
have to take into account the possibility of claiming early, and also the proper modeling
of the earnings test, which results in early claimers who work above the earnings test
limit seeing their beneﬁts increased by the time they reached the NRA (See Ben´ ıtez-
Silva and Heiland (2007) for a detailed description). Additionally, awpt(aw,y) is the
Markovian updating rule that approximates Social Security’s exact formula for updating
an individual’s average wage, and wpt summarizes the law of motion for next period’s
wealth, that is,
wpt(a,w,y,ss,ssd) = R[a + ssbt(w,y
′,ss,ssd) + y
′   τ(y
′,a)   c], (10)
where R is the return on saving, and τ(y,a) is the tax function, which includes income
taxes such as Federal income taxes and Social Security taxes and potentially other types









where σ is the estimated standard error in the regression (1). Note there is a potential
14“Jensen’s inequality” problem here due to the fact that we have substituted the conditional
expectation of wt+1 into the next period value function Vt+1 over wt+1 and awt+1 jointly.
However, the R2 for the regression of awt+1 on awt is virtually 1 with an extremely small
estimated standard error ˆ σ. Hence, in this case there is virtually no error resulting from
substituting what is an essentially deterministic mapping determining awt+1 from wt+1
and awt.
Above, ft(yjw) is a log-normal distribution of current earnings, given current age t
and average wage w, that is implied by (2) under the additional assumption of normality
in ηt. The discrete conditional probability distributions gt(ss′ja,w,ss,ssd) and kt(h′jh)
reﬂect the transition probabilities in the Social Security and health states, respectively.
Some additional assumptions implicit in our Dynamic Programming are:
 A period of employment (at least) follows the decision to work from unemployment
or from the previous job (after accepting a job-to-job oﬀer), if displacement does
not occur.
 At least one job oﬀer is received at the end of every period. Individuals decide to ac-
cept or not the oﬀer, and even if they accept the oﬀer, they could be displaced before
they start to work that period. We do not diﬀerentiate here between someone who
continues to work in a given job, and someone who changes jobs without a period
out of the labor market. This assumes implicitly the portability of the accumulated
tenure, a feature believed to be widely available to high skill individuals.
 There is, at least, a period of unemployment after displacement.
 The unemployment probability δ is a function of some characteristics of individuals
like average wage and age, and given that it is logically also a function of the
economic environment we use the higher empirical probabilities of the last couple
of years to simulate the consequences for individuals of facing higher uncertainty.
 We do not model the institutional details of private pension schemes or disability
insurance. However, we do model private savings.
 We assume an initial level of assets in the ﬁrst period, a(0) = a0, and assume they
face borrowing constraints, a(t)  0 for every t  τ.
3.3 Solving and Simulating the Model
Our interest in solving and simulating a model with the level of complexity we have
described is twofold. On the one hand, the model will be able to provide a variety of
predictions which we can then compare with the data, like the proportion of individuals
15claiming at diﬀerent ages, their beneﬁt levels, their consumption patterns, their labor
supply patterns, and their wealth levels. Additionally, the model will provide a set of
structural parameters which are the foundations of the model even when we change the
incentive structure to analyze the eﬀect of policy changes on the behavior of individuals.
As explained earlier, our model allows for four diﬀerent sources of uncertainty. The
random draws to simulate these sources of uncertainty, as well as the initial conditions
regarding wealth levels and average wages, will be the same for all the models compared in
the following. Thus, the diﬀerences presented in the results are only due to the changes in
the incentive schemes. Underlying these characterization of uncertainty is the assumption
that agents behave rationally given the information they have about the future (stochastic)
evolution of these state variables.
For computational simplicity, we assume that decisions are made annually rather than
monthly, but we allow for the beneﬁt adjustments due to earnings above the Earnings
Test limit to happen semi-annually following Ben´ ıtez-Silva and Heiland (2007).
4 Simulation Results
Table 4 presents our ﬁrst set of results. We show four panels of results, with the ﬁrst panel
using a benchmark model without employment uncertainty, but with the appropriate
characterization of the Earnings Test. As discussed in great detail in Ben´ ıtez-Silva and
Heiland (2007, 2008), and also in Ben´ ıtez-Silva et al. (2009), most of the retirement
literature has modeled the earnings test as a tax. However, this is incorrect, and distorts
the incentive structure in the direction of making early claiming less attractive. This
ﬁrst panel shows that the claiming peaks are relatively close to what we see in the data,
where our benchmark are the proportions from the Public-Use microdata for males. This
result convinces us of the need to account for the full incentive structure to characterize
optimal behavior in line with the empirical facts. The second panel presents our full
model, in which we introduce employment uncertainty. The model improves further, and
we now ﬁnd a distribution of claiming ages very close to the data reported by the U.S.
Social Security Administration. In particular, we capture the sharp peak at age 62, with
a simulated percentage almost identical to the males in the data, and we also capture the
peaks at age 63 and 65 we see in the Public-Use microdata and the aggregate SSA data.
These ﬁndings are no small accomplishment given how elusive has been for researchers
to explain the claiming behavior of Americans in the last decade and a half. Notice that
we accomplish this excellent ﬁt without relying on heterogeneous preferences or hard
to test beliefs about the future. Regarding labor supply, the qualitative results show a
declining labor supply at older ages, especially at age 62 and then at age 63 and 64. The
proportion of individuals working increases at age 65 and 66 mainly due to the phasing-out
16and eventual disappearance of the earnings test.10
It is important to highlight that the proper consideration of employment uncertainty is
correcting relevant biases in predicted labor supply and claiming behavior. For example,
comparing the ﬁrst and the second panels in Table 4 we can see that by not considering
such uncertainty when solving the model we would be biasing downwards by 7.3% and
8.1%, respectively, the work decision of workers of age 63 and 64. On the contrary, we
would be predicting a 7.8% larger work percentage among those aged 62. With respect to
claiming, the bias due to not considering employment uncertainty is even more important:
claiming at 65 is 24.2% bigger than the prediction under our benchmark case (Model 2
in Table 4). This table also provides the average monthly retirement beneﬁts (for those
claiming at those ages), the average monthly consumption levels (for all individuals of
that age), and the average wealth levels (for all individuals of that age) for the 10,000
simulations of the full model. The retirement beneﬁt levels are also remarkably in line
with what we observe in the aggregate Social Security data, giving us conﬁdence that
our modeling strategy regarding the average wage process and the wage process reﬂect
quite closely the earnings histories of the individuals currently claiming Social Security
retirement beneﬁts.
Regarding average monthly consumption, the levels we ﬁnd seem reasonable for a
single individual, however, our model does not predict a signiﬁcant decline in consumption
around retirement (although a small decline is observed), as widely documented in the
empirical literature. The latter is likely the result of our simpliﬁed structure which does
not account for the complexities involved in the consumption decisions around the time
of retirement as presented, for example, in Aguiar and Hurst (2005). We do not consider
this a serious drawback of our model given the diﬃculty of ﬁnding data which could
allow us to identify the diﬀerent consumption objectives of older individuals. The last
column also provides the average wealth level of individuals at diﬀerent ages, and we can
see the declining simulated wealth, which becomes steeper after age 63. Notice also the
eﬀect that increases in employment uncertainty have on wealth accumulation, with wealth
monotonically declining at all ages when uncertainty increases.
It is worth emphasizing that the wealth averages shown in the last column of Table 4
hide a much richer relationship between wealth accumulation and claiming. If we focus
10The model does include a part-time labor supply choice and we assume that agents can freely choose
to work part-time of full-time, which is not likely to be realistic and leads to a growing interest in part-time
work once agents reach the ages in which labor supply is more costly in utility terms. As we saw in Table
3, a fairly stable (across time and across older ages) proportion of individuals actually works part-time,
but since we do not model the mechanism that explains why some individuals might or might not receive
part-time oﬀers we have chosen not to modify the model in an ad-hoc way to match this proportion. We
have experimented with a model in which individuals can only choose whether to work full-time or not
to work at all, and in that case the proportion of those working at older ages does not increase. However,
in such a model early claiming is much less attractive, suggesting a connection between access to ﬂexible
labor supply and the decision to draw retirement beneﬁts.
17in the regular uncertainty case, and for example in the average wealth at age 61, which is
just below $103,000 in Model 2 of Table 4, we should emphasize that the average wealth
level varies tremendously depending on whether those individuals eventually claim at age
62 or higher. For example, the average wealth level at age 61 for individuals who claim
at age 62 is $66,845, while for those who end up claiming at age 63 is $96,482, and the
levels for claimants at ages 64 to 66 are $134,433, $164,669, and $173,736, respectively.
Interestingly, those who claim later end up consuming a lot of that wealth as they take
advantage of the guaranteed (if they survive) adjustment factors oﬀered by Social Secu-
rity. This should not be very surprising in the model given that we are assuming that
individuals obtain only a ﬁxed 2% interest rate on savings, so conditional on surviving to
the next period and accounting for a discount factor β, which is equal to 0.96, obtaining
the return on their expected Social Security beneﬁts oﬀered by the actuarial adjustment
can be optimal and therefore wealth de-accumulation can be a good strategy for some
individuals. This is exempliﬁed by the fact that by the time they actually claim, those
who claim at age 65, have on average wealth level of $111,562, around $50,000 less than
what they had accumulated by age 61. These ﬁndings are somewhat sensitive to the as-
sumptions regarding the interest rate and the discount factor, and are diﬃcult to compare
with the data due to the fact that we do not have housing in our model, which represents
the large majority of the savings of individuals at older ages.11
In the third panel of Table 4 we simulate the eﬀect of an increase in the unemployment
probabilities. We accomplish this by using the average of the empirical probabilities from
the 2008 and 2009 CPS, while in the benchmark simulations we were using the average
of the 1986 to 2006 period. Figure 1 shows the benchmark unemployment probabilities
as well as the new probabilities we use in the model. Notice the large increase in the
probability of becoming unemployed at all ages seen in the economy in the last couple
of years. From our results we conﬁrm that this increase in unemployment probabilities
aﬀect both claiming and labor supply. First, the proportion of those claiming early goes
up from 47% to 49% at age 62, and the proportion of those not working at age 62
goes up to nearly 52%, instead of the 50% of the benchmark. The wealth accumulation
decreases by between 4% and 6% (depending on age) as we introduce uncertainty in the
model, and by further 3% as we increase uncertainty to the level of the 2008-2009 period.
However, the beneﬁt levels and consumption levels are hardly aﬀected, which means
that individuals have adjusted through life-cycle decisions to this new more uncertain
11If for example, we increase the interest rate to 4% the level of wealth accumulation increases by
around 50% when individuals reach the 60s. However, the diﬀerence between the level accumulated, by
age 61, by those who claim at 62 and those that claim at 65 is much smaller with this higher interest rate,
which is what we could expect given the trade-oﬀs faced by the agents in the model. Notice, however,
that this higher (real) interest rate leads to a claiming hazard at the ERA that is too high (over 60%)
compared with the data.
18environment. We do not show the consequences at earlier ages, but we can report that,
for example, non-participation goes up under the new environment by between 2% and
3% when the individuals are in their 40s and 50s.
In Figure 2 we highlight another important ﬁnding from our model. The claiming
behavior is strongly correlated with the employment state of individuals in the period
before they claim beneﬁts, with a very high proportion (around 82%) of those not working
at age 61 eventually claiming at age 62, while this proportion drops to around 30% for
those working at age 61.12 Furthermore, the eﬀect of increasing employment uncertainty
is quite relevant for those who claim beneﬁts from non-work: claiming increases by 15%
at age 63 and about 10% at age 64 when such uncertainty is larger. The eﬀect is also
important, although a bit lower, among those who claim directly from work (11% at
age 63 and 9.6% at age 64). A ﬁnal important remark is that we ﬁnd almost the same
diﬀerential claiming behavior when we distinguish between those with good and bad
health. Claiming among the latter is much more concentrated at the ERA, around 87%
(basically comparable to the level from non-work) than among the former (27.7%). Hence,
it seems that those in bad economic or health condition take advantage of the ﬁrst available
retirement age to permanently exit from the labor market and enjoy their retirement
beneﬁts.
In the last panel of Table 4 we present the results of combining the increase in em-
ployment uncertainty with an increase in unemployment beneﬁts, which is in fact what
has happened in the last couple of years due to the recession, with the extended ben-
eﬁts provision at the Federal level, and the State level supplementations. We assume
unemployment beneﬁts are doubled which can be understood as going from 26 weeks to
52 weeks. We originally modeled an 80% approximate replacement rate on the average
wage as a proxy for recent wages, and therefore a full year of beneﬁts would replace 80%
of the average wage. Making a more generous unemployment beneﬁts system reduces
signiﬁcantly claiming of beneﬁts at age 62 (mainly due to a lower claiming from non-
employment) but increases claiming at age 65, and slightly increases consumption during
retirement, while higher employment uncertainty increases non-participation after age 62,
and slightly aﬀects also consumption and wealth level during retirement. The eﬀects on
consumption and wealth should not be surprising given the more generous system dur-
ing periods of unemployment. We conclude therefore that an increase in unemployment
beneﬁts justiﬁed by a likely increase in the likelihood in unemployment, has eﬀects on
claiming and labor supply, but if we assume that this comes as a surprise to individuals
12Using waves 1 and 2 of the HRS, so that we can unequivocally distinguish claiming retirement
beneﬁts from other Social Security beneﬁts (something not possible in subsequent waves), we found that
the empirical counterparts of these transitions are 63.25% and 31.8%, which we consider quite close given
the diﬃculty in matching not only the unconditional proportion of claimants (which we do quite closely),
but also their previous related states.
19of all ages, the eﬀects are modest.13
In terms of the average working life predicted for the diﬀerent models, as could be
expected, declines as we move from Model 1 to Model 4 as we introduce uncertainty. In
the model without employment uncertainty the average working life is 37.6 years, while in
model 2 drops by 3.6% to 36.28 years. Once we take into account the high uncertainty of
the last few years the drop in the working life increases, and the average working life we
simulate is 35.3 years. The introduction of higher unemployment beneﬁts further shortens
the working life to 34.6 years, a drop of 8% in the working life of the average individual
with respect to the model without uncertainty, or more than 3 years.
5 Policy Experiments and Employment Uncertainty
In this section we present the simulation results from various policy experiments we pro-
pose. In each case we simulate the labor supply consequences as well as the foreseeable
impact on the Social Security claiming behavior of individuals conditional on diﬀerent
levels of employment uncertainty, and discuss the likely eﬀect on the public accounts.
Table 5 presents the simulation results of four diﬀerent policy experiments, with a
further breakdown of the consequences by diﬀerent levels of employment uncertainty. The
leftmost set of results down the panels shows the simulations of the policy experiments
when employment uncertainty is not present, the middle set of panels shows the results
under the benchmark uncertainty (which uses the unemployment probabilities for the
1986-2006 period), and the rightmost set of panels show the results for the high uncertainty
cases (using the unemployment probabilities for the 2008-2009 period).
The ﬁrst set of panels of the table simulate the consequence of reducing (by 50%)
the Social Security tax paid by individuals who decide to work beyond age 59, without
modifying the eﬀect of their earnings on their future beneﬁts. This can be understood
as a direct income eﬀect for individuals who will keep a higher proportion of earnings,
and also employers who will see as an opportunity to hire these workers. We should
compare these results with those from the ﬁrst three panels of Table 4 depending on
the level of uncertainty assumed. We can see that the proportion of workers is slightly
higher under this scenario for all the ages shown, and that the proportion of individuals
claiming early is slightly lower, but a higher proportion claims before the Full Retirement
Age. The beneﬁts level is very similar, and consumption a bit higher. Notice that the
increases in uncertainty lead to earlier claiming (increase of about 2 percentage points
when going from no uncertainty to regular uncertainty, and another percentage point as
we simulate the high uncertainty case), small declines in labor supply in the early and
13If we assume it is not a surprise, so individuals can inter-temporally adjust to this increased uncer-
tainty the eﬀects are even smaller.
20late 60s (2.5 percentage points lower participation rates at age 62 as regular uncertainty
is considered), and slight increases in the mid 60s, responding in part to shorter careers
due to the increases in employment uncertainty. This policy experiment is related in
nature to the one proposed in Laitner and Silverman (2008), who within a fairly diﬀerent
life-cycle model, ﬁnd that the elimination of the payroll tax after a certain age or a
certain number of years with the resulting freeze of retirement beneﬁts (and increases in
payroll taxes at other ages to make the policy revenue neutral) would lead to a substantial
extension of the working life, of about a year. Their model does not account for any type
of uncertainty, any type of risk aversion, or any kind of intertemporal substitutabilities,
and they do not model labor supply and claiming behavior separately. Even with all these
diﬀerences our ﬁndings are qualitatively consistent with theirs (especially if we consider
that we only reduce the Social Security tax by 50% and still allow updates in the average
wage), something quite reassuring. Quantitatively, we ﬁnd that the average working life
increases only by about 2.5 months (with respect to the benchmark model with standard
uncertainty, which predicts an average working life of about 36.28 years) with the reform
we propose.
The second set of panels in Table 5 shows a slightly diﬀerent policy, by increasing
the average wage of those who work full-time after age 59 by 1.5%, above and beyond
the possible increase in the average wage coming from actually choosing to earn a wage.
We can see that the proportion of workers is much higher under this scenario for all
the ages shown but in particular for ages 62 to 65 where we see very large eﬀects on
labor supply. For example, the proportion of individuals working at age 62 goes from
50% in the benchmark model to more than 65% under the new policy and benchmark
uncertainty. The eﬀect is even more dramatic for ages 63 and 64, where the proportion
of workers goes from around 32% to between 48% and 68%, depending on the level of
uncertainty. These results come to show the sizable eﬀect of making work more appealing
by aﬀecting the average wage, which directly aﬀects future beneﬁts for these workers. In
terms of the average length of the working life, the increase is quite substantial, and we
estimate it to be around 21 months with respect to the benchmark model with standard
uncertainty. Also, the proportion of individuals claiming at age 62 is much higher than
in the benchmark simulations (increases by about 20% to around 54% of individuals
claiming at the ERA), and a higher proportion claims before the Full Retirement Age.
Analyzing the results for this policy experiment across uncertainty levels we see a slight
trend towards earlier claiming as the uncertainty increases and a uniform, but very small,
decline in participation across ages.
The third set of panels in Table 5 shows the consequences of a complete elimination of
the earnings test at all ages, similar to what was done in the year 2000 for those above the
Full Retirement Age. Under this scenario the decision to claim beneﬁts and the decision to
21work are not connected through the level of beneﬁts that the person will receive, although
of course remain connected through the budget constraint of the individual in terms of
total available resources. We can see that now the claiming at age 62 goes up sharply,
compared with the benchmark model (regardless of the level of uncertainty studied) and
also with the two other policy experiments. However, labor supply is not aﬀected in such
a dramatic fashion, although the labor force participation rates are considerably lower at
age 62, and considerably higher afterwards. The average length of the working career goes
up by about 2.84 months compared with the benchmark model with standard uncertainty.
The last set of results of Table 5 shows the consequences of increasing the Normal
Retirement Age to 69. The most clear consequence of this policy change is twofold. On
the one hand, to delay retirement claiming considerably, with a sharp decline in those
claiming at age 62 (of around 20% regardless of the level of uncertainty simulated), and
increasing considerably those claiming after age 65. On the other hand we have also a
sharply increasing labor supply at ages 62 and 63, and lowering it from age 64 to 66.
The average length of a working life goes up by around 8.28 months, with respect to the
benchmark model with standard uncertainty, which is quite substantial. The consequences
of increasing uncertainty in this case are rather small, except for some small age-dependent
variation in claiming behavior and labor supply. Notice, however, that claiming for the
ﬁrst time at exactly age 69, the new NRA, is not favored by our agents, which should
not be surprising given that the agents face the same longevity expectations as before,
while their beneﬁts have been reduced considerably. This result is also due to the fact
that, at the same time, they have lost the sizable Delayed Retirement Credit, which in the
previous models increased the retirement beneﬁt by 8% for every year that the individuals
delayed claiming beyond the NRA (66 in the previous panels).
5.1 Budgetary Consequences of the Policy Experiments
Table 6 shows the results of calculating the present values of Income Taxes paid, Social
Security Taxes paid, and Beneﬁts Received by agents, resulting from averaging 10,000
simulations of the benchmark model and the four policy experiments we have discussed
above. The leftmost column shows the means and standard deviations of those measures
for the benchmark characterization of our model, while the rest of columns shows the
results for the policy experiments. Interestingly, the diﬀerent policy measures are fairly
neutral from a budgetary perspective, except for the increase in the Normal Retirement
Age to 69, which, not surprisingly, has a sizable dampening eﬀect on the Present Value of
Beneﬁts received by the average individual. Notice that this is very much expected since
an increase in the Normal Retirement Age is equivalent to a cut in beneﬁts, conditional
on individuals living the same average number of years after claiming beneﬁts. In general,
22the main defense of policies that increase the NRA is that they are implemented in order
to be generationally and actuarially fair. This means that when we compare cohorts with
diﬀerent longevities, younger cohorts do not end up receiving more beneﬁts over their
lifetime than older cohorts whose longevities were generally shorter. The case of higher
NRA also leads to slightly higher income taxes paid due to the increase in labor supply
explained when discussing the last panels of Table 5, mainly when individuals are in their
early 60s.
The only other policy that has a sizable budgetary eﬀect is the increase in Average
Wages for those 60 and over. This policy has an important eﬀect on the Income Tax based
as well as the Social Security Taxes collected, given that the increase in labor supply is
quite substantial for this policy as shown in Table 5.
6 Wealth Shocks and Employment Uncertainty
Table 7 shows the eﬀects on labor supply and claiming behavior of simulating wealth
shocks in order to provide some discussion of the likely eﬀects of the economic downturn
that happened during, especially, 2008 and 2009. We provide three diﬀerent scenarios
of surprise wealth shocks. Notice that we are assuming individuals could not predict
these events, and therefore the analysis we present should be understood as age by age
instantaneous eﬀects on the two key variables of interest. This means individuals in
these simulations are not able to adjust intertemporally to the new scenario but can
only respond with the choices available to them, mainly labor supply and claiming of
retirement beneﬁts, but also their consumption and savings decisions. As in Table 5, we
provide the results for each scenario and each employment uncertainty level. This means
the ﬁrst set of columns in the table should be compared with the ﬁrst panel of Table 4,
and the second set of columns with the second panel, and the same for the third. The
ﬁrst scenario proposes a mild wealth shock, in which the rate of return on savings goes
down from the assumed ﬁxed rate of 2% to 1%. Again, this 50% decline in the rate on
return on savings happens as a surprise for individuals of all ages. This shock sharply
increases labor supply for individuals ages 63 to 65, while for the rest of the ages the eﬀect
is also positive but quite small. Regarding claiming, the eﬀect is to make early claiming
more appealing, with a higher proportion of individuals claiming at age 62 and 63 (with
increases of 3 to 5 percentage points), and much smaller proportions claiming at older
ages. The eﬀects are quite similar across the uncertainty categories.
The second scenario reports the simulated eﬀects of a surprise decline in wealth of
10%. This is in line with the implied yearly declines in wealth levels during the economic
crisis, as reported in the SCF 2009 compared with the levels of 2007. As Bricker et
al. (2011) discuss, the average decline in net wealth in the two year period between the
23two SCF surveys, was around 19%, and the decline in median wealth was around 23%.
While they explain that this decline was not uniform across families and across ages, we
are simulating a surprise decline for all our agents and at all ages. The eﬀects of this
substantial wealth decline are very clear. First of all, the claiming distribution becomes
much more skewed with more than 3 out of 4 individuals deciding to claim exactly at the
early retirement age, and most of the rest claiming just one year later, at age 63. Given
our previous ﬁnding regarding how early claiming is very much linked with relatively
lower accumulation of resources, the bad shock pushes a large proportion of individuals
towards drawing as early as possible from their Social Security beneﬁts. Regarding labor
supply the eﬀect is very large and positive for all ages except age 62. In some cases the
percentage point increase in labor force participation is well into the double digits, and
even for individuals age 60 to 61 the eﬀect is between 4 and 5 percentage points. The
only decline in participation happens exactly at age 62, mainly due to the 50% increase
in claiming hazard at that age, which results in a large labor supply response.
Remember, that the reported eﬀect is the instantaneous age eﬀect, so in this case it
has to be understood as the predicted response of those age 62 when they discovered their
savings declined by 10% instead of accumulating at the ﬁxed interest rate they have taken
as given. It seems that agents then choose to draw from their beneﬁts, and enjoy some
leisure. In any case, overwhelmingly, the surprise wealth shocks results in more work and
more early claiming, and again this is quite similar across uncertainty levels.
The last scenario shows the consequences of the accumulated wealth eﬀect (of around
20%) of the crisis following the ﬁndings from the SCF 2009. The simulations are quali-
tatively similar to those of Scenario 2 but quantitatively ampliﬁed, so individuals claim
even earlier, with around 82% now claiming at the early retirement age, and with labor
force participation responding even more sharply, with the age 62 decline predicted to be
much smaller in this case.
In terms of length of working lives, in Scenario 2 we ﬁnd that the average working
life in the case of standard uncertainty increases by about 3 years to 39.38, with respect
to the benchmark model, and by about four years in the case of Scenario 3 to about 40
years of work experience, when the wealth decline is of about 20%. These wealth eﬀects
are quite large, and are apparently at odds with the results on the relationship between
wealth changes and retirement by the research of Hurd, Reti, and Rohwedder (2009) and
Hurd and Reti (2001). They estimate that the response to wealth changes is small. Our
results, when taken together with our ﬁndings on the drop in labor supply due to increases
in employment uncertainty, suggest that previous research that did not take into account
that during recessions wealth declines while employment uncertainty increases, interpret
small behavioral changes to ﬁnancial crisis (or ﬁnancial booms) as suggesting that wealth
eﬀects are small. Once we model both employment uncertainty and unanticipated wealth
24changes, we can observe that those two eﬀects somewhat oﬀset each other, which would
predict, for any reduced form analysis of labor supply responses, smaller wealth eﬀects
than if they were to happen in a stable employment environment. Our ﬁndings are more in
line with the work of Cheng and French (2000), and Coronado and Perozek (2004) which
ﬁnd larger labor supply eﬀects due to the fact that their empirical design allowed them to
better control for unobserved factors driving wealth accumulation and their labor market
responses. This brings home the point of why the modeling eﬀort we have undertaken in
this paper is a worthy enterprise.
We have also performed budgetary calculations similar to those of the previous section,
and for example, in the second scenario we ﬁnd that taxes and beneﬁts received are quite
similar to the benchmark, with only slight decreases in income taxes paid and slight
increases in Social Security taxes paid by agents under the surprised wealth shock scenario.
7 Conclusions
The world economy has gone and it is still going through one of its worse periods in
recent memory. Unemployment rates around the developed world have reached very high
levels, and workers of all ages and in almost all occupations have seen an increase in
the probability of losing their jobs, a decline in their re-employment probabilities, and a
considerable loss of the value of their retirement portfolios. These events likely increase the
reliance that most older workers will have on public social insurance programs, exactly at
a time that public ﬁnances are suﬀering from the drop in contributions, in a demographic
environment that suggest life expectancies will continue to increase.
All this means that public policy needs more than ever the work of economists to
provide a path towards sustainability of social insurance programs in a age of increased
risks and increased challenges coming from the sky rocketing costs of health care, increased
longevity, declining fertility and growing immigration. Our paper is a step in this direction
by providing a model that accounts for a source of uncertainty that has been relatively
overlooked in terms of its link with retirement decisions, but that has grown in importance
as older workers are no longer conﬁned to traditional careers with long tenure and little
uncertainty over future employment.
We show that our extended model does a good job in matching important (and rather
elusive) features of the data, and ﬁnd that individuals claiming decisions and labor sup-
ply behavior are responsive to changes in employment uncertainty and unemployment
beneﬁts, suggesting that the changing retirement behavior (in terms of claiming beneﬁts
early and aﬀecting the labor force participation) in the last decade is likely to be at least
in part due to the changing labor market uncertainty faced by individuals. We ﬁnd that
introducing employment uncertainty in the model increases early claiming and reduces
25labor force participation at older ages. Furthermore, in the exercise where we analyze
the eﬀects of increasing employment uncertainty (going from an average 3.2% probability
of losing their jobs in a given year to about 5%), leads to an implied elasticity of these
two individual decisions with respect to unemployment uncertainty of around 0.1. We
also ﬁnd that labor supply at older ages is very responsive to a policy that would make
work more attractive after age 59 by aﬀecting the average wage of individuals, providing
a policy recommendation worth considering to increase labor force participation at those
ages. The model also allows us to simulate the eﬀects of large drops in ﬁnancial wealth
balances, similar to those experimented by families during the recession. We ﬁnd that, in
general, wealth shocks result in higher labor force participation and earlier claiming, and
we also ﬁnd that the modeling of wealth shocks in the presence of employment uncertainty
can explain why some previous research have found small labor supply eﬀects (especially
around retirement) of unexpected wealth changes.
Therefore, our ﬁndings indicate that the combination of the eﬀects that higher em-
ployment uncertainty and negative wealth shocks have on labor supply and claiming, can
explain why early claiming has remained very high in the United States even as the early
retirement penalties have increased substantially compared with previous periods, and
why labor force participation has remained quite high for older workers even in the midst
of the worse employment crisis in a generation.
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29Appendix: Social Security Incentives for Early Retire-
ment in the United States
Individuals who claim beneﬁts before the NRA but continue to work or reenter the labor
force can reduce the early retirement penalty by suspending beneﬁt payments.14 The
Actuarial Reduction Factor, ARF, (or early retirement reduction factor), in turn, will be
increased proportionally to the number of months without beneﬁts, which will increase
beneﬁts permanently after the individual reaches the NRA.15 This adjustment of the ARF
allows those who become beneﬁciaries before the NRA to partially or completely reverse
the ﬁnancial consequences of their decision, averting being locked-in at the reduced rate.
In the sequel of this section the exact details of these incentives are presented.
Benet Calculation
Individuals aged 62 or older who had earned income that was subject to the Social Security
payroll tax for at least 10 years since 1951 are eligible for retirement beneﬁts under the
Old Age beneﬁts program (OA program). Earnings are subject to the tax up to an
income maximum that is updated annually according to increases in the national average
annual wage.16 To determine the monthly beneﬁt amount (MBA), the Social Security
Administration calculates the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) of a worker as a concave
piece-wise linear function of the worker’s average earnings subject to Social Security taxes
taken over her 35 years of highest earnings. If the beneﬁts are claimed at the NRA (66 for
those born between 1943 and 1954, and currently at 65 and 8 months), the MBA equals
the PIA. If an individual decides to begin receiving beneﬁts before the NRA and exits the
labor force or stays below the earnings limit, her MBA is reduced by up to 25%, assuming
a NRA of 66. Under the current regulation of the OA program, the monthly beneﬁt
amount received upon ﬁrst claiming beneﬁts depends on the age (month) of initiation of
Social Security beneﬁts, in the following way,
MBAt =
{
(0.75 + 0.05  1
12  MP3Y)  PIA,if claimed more than 3 years before NRA;
(0.80 + 0.20  1
36  M3Y)*PIA,if claimed within the 3 years before NRA
where MBAt represents the monthly beneﬁt amount before the NRA (see SSA-S 2005,
p.18), MP3Y are the months not claimed in the period prior to 3 years before NRA, and
M3Y are months not claimed in in the 3 years before NRA. Assuming that the individual
14In this paper, we are not considering spousal beneﬁts and joint decision making in the household.
The complexities introduced by those considerations are out of the scope of this analysis. See Gustman
and Steinmeier (1991), Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten (2002), and Votruba (2003) for a discussion.
By ignoring spousal beneﬁts we are not taking into account the fact that approximately 5.96% of the
individuals who receive some type of Old Age, Survivors, or Disability Insurance (OASDI) beneﬁts receive
them as spouses of entitled retirees. This percentage comes from the Public-Use Microdata File provided
by the Social Security Administration and refers to a 1% random sample of all beneﬁciaries as of December
of 2001.
15Given a NRA of 66, which will be the prevailing one for the cohort born between 1943 and 1954, the
Actuarial Reduction Factor is a number between 0.75 and 1 depending on when the individual claims
beneﬁts, and how many months he or she earns above the Earnings Test after claiming beneﬁts.
16As of 2010 this maximum is $106,800.
30continues to receive beneﬁts, her MBAt is permanently reduced. The Actuarial Reduction
Factor (ARF) underlying this calculation is a permanent reduction of beneﬁts by 5/9 of
1 percent per month for each month in which beneﬁts are received in the three years
immediately prior to the NRA. The reduction of beneﬁts is 5/12 of 1 percent for every
month before that. Thus, the maximum actuarial reduction will reach 30 percent as the
NRA increases to 67 over the next few years (see SSA-S 2005, p.18).17
Actuarial Reduction Factor
One less-emphasized feature of the process of beneﬁt reduction due to early retirement
is the possibility to reduce the penalty even after initiating the receipt of beneﬁts. The
speciﬁcs of this adjustment to the Actuarial Reduction Factor are documented in the
Social Security Handbook (SSA-H, x724. Basic reduction formulas, x728. Adjustment of
reduction factor at FRA) and in the internal operating manual used by Social Security
ﬁeld employees when processing claims for Social Security beneﬁts (SSA-M, RS00615.
Computation of Monthly Beneﬁts Amounts) but may not be well-understood by the re-
tirees.18 To illustrate this feature of the system, suppose the NRA is 66 years, and an
individual claims beneﬁts at age 62 and n months, where n < 48, receives checks for x
months where (n + x < 48), and suspends receiving checks after that until she turns 66
(after which she retires for good). In this case she receives x checks of
MBAt =
{
(0.75 + 0.05  1
12  n)  PIA if claimed more than 3 years before NRA,
(0.80 + 0.20  1
36  n)  PIA if claimed within the 3 years before NRA.
After turning 66, her MBA will be permanently increased to
MBAt = [0.75 + (0.20 
1
36
 n) + (0.20 
1
36
 (36   n   x)) + 0.05]  PIA. (12)
It is important to note that the adjustment of the ARF is automatic and becomes
eﬀective only after reaching the NRA.
Earnings Test
The Earnings Test limit deﬁnes the maximum amount of income from work that a bene-
ﬁciary who claims beneﬁts before the NRA under OASI may earn while still receiving the
17The reductions in beneﬁts for early claimers are designed to be approximately actuarially fair for the
average individual. During the post-NRA period additional adjustments exist: Workers claiming beneﬁts
after the NRA earn the delayed retirement credit (DRC). For those born in 1943 or later it is 2/3 of 1
percent for each month up to age 70 which is considered actuarially fair. For those born before 1943 it
ranges from 11/24 to 5/8 of 1 percent per month, depending on their birth year. For a discussion of the
evolution of actuarial fairness in the last decades see Heiland and Yin (2011)
18The Social Security Administration does not use the term Actuarial Reduction Factor in their publi-
cations, but a number of the people we have talked to within the administration do use this terminology.
In publications the related concept of “Reduction Factor(s)” (RF) which is simply the number of months
in which beneﬁts were received before the NRA is used. The RF maps into a “Fraction” that ranges
between 0.75 and 1 (for an ERA of 62 and an NRA of 66). The latter corresponds to what we refer to as
ARF. The ARF (“Fraction”) is adjusted upwards at the NRA according to the number of months before
the NRA in which beneﬁts were withheld.
31“full” MBA.19 Earnings above the limit are taxed at a rate of 50 percent for beneﬁciaries
between age 62 and the January of the year in which they reach the NRA, and 33 percent
from January of that year until the month they reach the NRA (SSA-S 2005, p.19; SSA-S
2005, Table 2.A18). For the latter period, the earnings limit is higher, $34,680, compared
with $14,160 for the earlier period as of 2010. Starting in 2000, the Earnings Test was
eliminated for individuals over the NRA.
Individuals who continue or reenter employment after claiming Social Security beneﬁts
before the NRA, and whose earning power or hours constraints are such that their income
from work is around or below the earnings limit, are mailed their full monthly check from
Social Security and are locked-in at the reduced beneﬁt rate permanently. Those with
earnings above the limit will not receive checks from Social Security for some months and
thereby adjust their ARF.20 Individuals have the option of informing Social Security to
suspend the monthly beneﬁt payment at any time if they believe they will be making
earnings high enough above the Earnings Test. However, during the ﬁrst year after
claiming beneﬁts, the Social Security Administration performs a monthly test to determine
whether the person should receive the monthly check. As a result an early claimer who
is not working or earns below the limit in the months after claiming (“grace year”) will
receive all monthly beneﬁts even if earnings for that calendar year exceed the Earnings Test
limit due to high earnings before claiming.21 After the ﬁrst year, the test is typically yearly
and it depends on the expected earnings of the individual. Given the scarce documentation
of the functioning of the ARF, having earned above the earnings limit, and thus receiving
fewer checks, may be a common way for beneﬁciaries to learn about the possibility of
undoing the early retirement penalty.22
19Some sources of income do not count under the Earnings Test. For details see SSA-H x1812. Notice
that retirement contributions by the employer do not count towards the limit, but additional contributions
by the employee even if they are through a payroll deduction are counted. This means that individuals
earning above the limit cannot just increase their retirement savings to avoid being subject to the limit.
We thank Barbara Lingg and Christine Vance from the Social Security Administration for clarifying this
point, which is rarely discussed in any publication.
20A beneﬁciary may receive a partial monthly beneﬁt at the end of the tax year if there are excess
earnings that do not completely oﬀset the monthly beneﬁt amount (see SSA-H, x1806).
21Social Security claim specialists emphasized to us that during the ﬁrst year after claiming they do
what is most advantageous to the claimer, the monthly or the yearly test, if they have enough information.
However, they failed to clarify what that means. Some of them said the number of checks individuals
receive is maximized, but we were unable to ﬁnd documentation of such practices. In any case, the
internal operating instructions used by Social Security ﬁeld employees when processing claims for Social
Security beneﬁts state that the monthly earnings test only applies for the calendar year when beneﬁts
are initiated unless the type of beneﬁt changes (see SSA-M, RS02501.030).
22See Ben´ ıtez-Silva and Heiland (2008) for a numeric example of the streams of income resulting from
these incentives.
32Table A.1. Key Parametrizations of the Model
Parameter Value Use Source
 0.96 Discount Factor Calibration
 -0.37 Risk Aversion Utility Function Eq. (3)
Leisure of a FT Worker 0.54 Leisure Utility Function Eq. (3)
Interest Rate 2% Wealth Accumulation Calibration
Maximum Taxable Earnings 94,200 Maximum Soc. Sec. Taxes SSA 2006
Earnings Test ERA to 65 12,480 Work and Claim SSA 2006
Earnings Test 65 to NRA 33,240 Work and Claim SSA 2006
Part-time Penalty 1 0.61 on the $ Age 21 to 60 CPS 1986-2009
Part-time Penalty 2 0.75 on the $ Age 61 to 64 CPS 1986-2009
Part-time Penalty 3 0.8 on the $ Age 65+ CPS 1986-2009
Notes: When appropriate the sources are mentioned in some detail in the text.
33Table 1: US Social Security Claiming facts. Annual Statistical Supplement (in $ of 2005)
Age 1994 1996 1998a 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009
62 0.5886 0.6008 0.5833 0.5171 0.5602 0.5753 0.5664 0.5384 0.5131 0.5316
63 0.0789 0.0746 0.0801 0.0671 0.0777 0.0810 0.0830 0.0857 0.0788 0.0777
64 0.1212 0.1080 0.1077 0.1045 0.1484 0.1094 0.0993 0.1047 0.0988 0.0828
65 0.1566 0.1568 0.1557 0.1959 0.1724 0.1862 0.1975 0.2232 0.2608 0.1376
66 0.0182 0.0199 0.0210 0.0392 0.0096 0.0122 0.0130 0.0111 0.0159 0.1351
67-69 0.0230 0.0256 0.0286 0.0550 0.0152 0.0177 0.0188 0.0190 0.0166 0.0202
70+ 0.0128 0.0140 0.0232 0.0208 0.0161 0.0178 0.0205 0.0179 0.0160 0.0147
Claimantsb 1,444.5 1,396.1 1,441.3 1,758.9 1,595.5 1,680.3 1,793.5 1,771.8 2,010.9 2,416.5
Average beneﬁts
62 788.58 785.31 815.35 864.56 892.58 888.31 881.9 877.98 904.6 911.79
63 882.14 942.89 907.85 960.51 1,002.8 996.66 986.9 1,009.4 1003.3 1,032.0
64 981.51 997.16 1,001.7 1,020.4 1,119.8 1,102.0 1,089.8 1,088.6 1,048.5 1,072.8
65 1,083.9 1,087.8 1,088.0 1,184.5 1,239.2 1,270.9 1,298.3 1,335.0 1,363.6 1,260.0
66 1,022.4 1,033.0 1,030.4 1,247.6 881.73 981.26 1,052.2 1,087.1 1,279.7 1,545.6
67 1,027.8 1,071.4 1,050.2 1,285.7 873.48 933.59 1,010.4 1,012.4 1,233.2 1,318.1
Notes: a The percentages do not coincide with those reported in the Statistical Supplements since we
have not counted the 120,000 widows who were converted in these years from widow beneﬁts to retirement
beneﬁts. b In thousands of claimers. Does not include disability conversions at the NRA.
Table 2: US Males Retirement Beneﬁts Claiming Behavior. Public-Use Micro-data Files
New Male claimants, proportions, 1994-2004 (w/o DI conversions)
Age 1994 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
62 0.489 0.509 0.491 0.473 0.414 0.453 0.460 0.465 0.478
63 0.162 0.150 0.163 0.152 0.137 0.163 0.160 0.148 0.142
64 0.081 0.072 0.071 0.072 0.061 0.075 0.073 0.073 0.072
65 0.207 0.201 0.207 0.212 0.248 0.273 0.275 0.282 0.219
66 0.022 0.025 0.024 0.033 0.054 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.076
67 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.018 0.031 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.004
68 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.012 0.021 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002
69 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.013 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.001
Claimants 5,766 6,001 6,344 6,970 8,169 7,195 7,266 7,404 7,794
Average monthly benets in $ of 2005. Adjusted by the ARF and the DRC
Age 1994 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
62 1,203.60 1,179.96 1,233.06 1,302.46 1,315.69 1,352.61 1,402.60 1,414.35 1,356.50
63 1,161.82 1,178.75 1,199.40 1,205.90 1,275.80 1,264.56 1,310.93 1,355.05 1,317.45
64 1,209.15 1,227.03 1,209.64 1,223.97 1,240.47 1,322.56 1,344.97 1,359.56 1,354.08
65 1,260.02 1,264.51 1,243.25 1,234.88 1,258.35 1,298.34 1,348.48 1,384.61 1,349.91
66 1,333.34 1,275.72 1,279.76 1,286.73 1,331.57 944.09 856.84 1,157.49 1,300.07
67 1,205.93 1,261.28 1,155.12 1,274.97 1,398.17 848.03 869.19 925.18 1,078.54
68 1,062.62 1,191.53 1,238.22 1,183.47 1,367.90 918.91 922.04 679.81 678.86
69 1,311.41 1,218.69 1,140.63 1,211.33 1,333.55 1,069.62 852.70 712.98 836.69
Data Source: OASDI Public-Use Microdata File 2004. Social Security Administration.
34Table 3: Labor Supply Facts (CPS, 1996-2006)
full-time 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
60 56.27 50.63 54.56 52.79 54.87 56.64
61 51.17 50.80 57.67 48.02 52.05 54.46
62 39.95 41.10 39.93 39.09 41.94 44.45
63 30.09 31.39 31.32 32.88 37.45 39.76
64 23.81 26.08 30.78 30.32 30.31 32.87
65 21.48 18.06 23.20 23.47 23.14 26.05
66 15.65 15.42 22.98 19.20 20.41 20.47
67 12.66 12.52 15.76 16.94 17.70 15.61
part-time 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
60 10.73 12.91 10.34 11.19 11.79 11.27
61 12.38 12.76 11.03 12.16 10.96 11.14
62 11.28 13.35 12.14 13.61 10.86 12.59
63 15.28 14.66 12.76 13.32 12.98 13.87
64 13.12 10.69 13.95 14.91 12.30 12.70
65 14.68 14.30 13.65 13.95 13.74 13.95
66 16.66 12.34 13.32 13.74 12.35 14.74
67 14.61 12.04 15.04 14.06 11.53 12.45
no work 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
60 33.00 36.47 35.10 36.02 33.33 32.09
61 36.44 36.44 31.30 39.82 36.99 34.41
62 48.77 45.54 47.93 47.30 47.20 42.96
63 54.63 53.94 55.92 53.80 49.57 46.36
64 63.07 63.22 55.28 54.76 57.38 54.42
65 63.84 67.63 63.15 62.58 63.12 60.00
66 67.70 72.24 63.70 67.06 67.24 64.79



























2025 2630 3135 3640 4145 4650 5155 5660 6165 6670 7175 7680 8185 8690 9199
agegroup
dp19862006 dp20082009
Figure 1: Heterogeneous Unemployment Probabilities
36Table 4: US 10,000 Simulations of the Dynamic Retirement Model
Ages Survivors Worka Claimersb Benets ($) Consum. ($) Wealth ($)
Model 1: Earnings Test with ARF Adjustments. No Uncertainty
Age 60 8,331 5,812 (69.8%) | | 1,985 114,319
Age 61 8,205 5,760 (70.2%) | | 2,009 109,551
Age 62 8,055 4,400 (54.6%) 3,466 (44.19%) 997 2,022 104,086
Age 63 7,883 2,634 (33.4%) 1,287 (16.4%) 1,115 2,032 100,158
Age 64 7,726 2,713 (35.1%) 964 (12.3%) 1,270 2,028 91,312
Age 65 7,555 3,363 (44.5%) 1,812 (23.1%) 1,392 1,944 82,098
Age 66 7,357 4,783 (65%) 313 (3.99%) 1,484 1,956 78,923
Model 2 (Benchmark): ET with ARF Adjustments and Employment Uncertainty
Age 60 8,331 5,625 (67.5%) | | 1,957 107,576
Age 61 8,205 5,560 (67.77%) | | 1,984 102,953
Age 62 8,055 4,081 (50.67%) 3,726(47.33%) 999 1,999 97,571
Age 63 7,883 2,559 (32.46%) 1,437(18.25%) 1,115 2,005 93,695
Age 64 7,726 2,924 (37.85%) 1,042(13.24%) 1,273 1,986 85,589
Age 65 7,555 3,659 (48.43%) 1,463(18.6%) 1,397 1,927 78,244
Age 66 7,357 4,753 (64.61%) 203(2.58%) 1,477 1,946 76,135
Model 3: Benchmark Model with Higher Employment Uncertainty
Age 60 8,331 5,528 (66.35%) | | 1,941 104,440
Age 61 8,205 5,441 (66.31%) | | 1,968 99,866
Age 62 8,055 3,895 (48.35%) 3,891(49.2%) 1,003 1,983 94,583
Age 63 7,883 2,595 (32.91%) 1,548(19.61%) 1,155 1,986 90,789
Age 64 7,726 3,055 (39.54%) 1,035(13.11%) 1,273 1,971 83,555
Age 65 7,555 3,772 (49.92%) 1,253(15.87%) 1,398 1,921 77,199
Age 66 7,357 4,632 (62.96%) 167(2.11%) 1,475 1,938 75,498
Model 4: Benchmark Model with Higher Employment Uncertainty and Higher Unemployment Benets
Age 60 8,331 5,500 (66%) | | 2,019 114,842
Age 61 8,205 5,406 (65.89%) | | 2,043 110,265
Age 62 8,055 3,967 (49.25%) 3,291 (42%) 998 2,051 105,100
Age 63 7,883 2,298 (29.15%) 1,283 (16.37%) 1,154 2,059 100,829
Age 64 7,726 2,419 (31.3%) 1,080 (13.78%) 1,259 2,049 92,153
Age 65 7,555 3,128 (41.4%) 1,786 (22.79%) 1,389 1,973 83,645
Age 66 7,357 4,402 (59.83%) 395 (5.04%) 1,473 1,990 81,117
Notes: aIn numbers, and as percentage of survivors. bNumber of First Claimers at that age,
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Figure 2: Claiming and Previous Employment
38Table 5: Policy Experiments. 10,000 Simulations of the Dynamic Model
No Uncertainty Benchmark Uncertainty High Uncertainty
Ages Worka Claimingb Work Claiming Work Claiming
Experiment 1: Lower Social Security Taxes for those 60+
Age 60 69.98% | 67.77% | 66.51% |
Age 61 70.19% | 67.74% | 67.52% |
Age 62 59% 42.76% 56.47% 45.14% 54.84% 46.39%
Age 63 36.92% 20.07% 34.62% 22.44% 34.01% 24.52%
Age 64 37.57% 13.24% 39.89% 13.62% 41.39% 13.51%
Age 65 47.45% 20.44% 50.43% 16.82% 52.16% 14.08%
Age 66 65.89% 3.47% 65.5% 1.97% 63.71% 1.48%
Age 67 67.06% 0% 65% 0% 63.06% 0%
Experiment 2: Higher Average Wage for those working at 60+
Age 60 70.18% | 67.98% | 66.76% |
Age 61 70.1% | 67.74% | 66.19% |
Age 62 66.85% 53.51% 65.08% 54.07% 63.76% 54.63%
Age 63 68.62% 8.47% 66.22% 9.18% 64.86% 9.92%
Age 64 53.4% 23.1% 49.4% 24.79% 48.68% 24.34%
Age 65 55.66% 14.58% 56.52% 11.83% 55.66% 16.27%
Age 66 67.79% 0.34% 66.22% 0.14% 64.16% 1.14%
Age 67 67.99% 0% 66.15% 0% 63.91% 0%
Experiment 3: Removal of the Earnings Test
Age 60 69.78% | 67.53% | 66.38% |
Age 61 70.2% | 67.76% | 66.31% |
Age 62 47.11% 58.3% 42.53% 62.26% 39.6% 65.07%
Age 63 41.63% 10.76% 41.93% 11.76% 42.58% 12.46%
Age 64 41.81% 9.56% 44.88% 10.12% 46.76% 9.46%
Age 65 49.62% 18.3% 52.91% 14.21% 54.12% 11.69%
Age 66 65.71% 3.06% 65.27% 1.65% 63.46% 1.31%
Age 67 66.54% 0% 64.88% 0% 62.57% 0%
Experiment 4: Normal Retirement Age set to 69
Age 60 69.73% | 67.48% | 66.23% |
Age 61 70.14% | 67.65% | 66.14% |
Age 62 61.58% 38.97% 59.85% 39.36% 58.47% 40.79%
Age 63 54.97% 11.42% 50.53% 14.37% 49.29% 15.79%
Age 64 40.62% 14.3% 39.15% 15.9% 39.64% 15.98%
Age 65 40.89% 9.46% 42.71% 9.66% 44.29% 9.03%
Age 66 45.49% 10.93% 49.16% 9.97% 49.76% 9.49%
Age 67 54.57% 10.8% 57.03% 9.13% 56.96% 7.62%
Age 68 64.39% 4.12% 64.22% 1.59% 62.52% 1.28%
Age 69 63.92% 0% 62.88% 0% 61.17% 0%
Notes: aAs percentage of survivors. bFirst Claimers at that age, and as percentage of the total who ever claimed.
39Table 6: Budgetary Consequences of the Proposed Policy Reforms
Item Benchmark Lower S.S. Taxes Higher AW No E.T. NRA=69
PV of Income Taxes Paid 134,444 134,883 144,566 134,715 136,116
Std. of Income Taxes 59,409 59,660 67,510 59,968 60,260
PV of Soc. Sec. Taxes Paid 43,171 41,844 45,585 43,240 43,609
Std. of Soc. Sec. Taxes 15,005 14,360 17,030 15,090 15,122
PV of Beneﬁts Received 67,515 67,533 67,518 67,545 55,126
Std. of Beneﬁts Received 50,589 50,574 53,598 49,750 43,221
Notes: Averages of 10,000 simulations, discounted to the initial period, assuming an interest rate of 2%,
as in the model.
Table 7: Wealth Shocks. 10,000 Simulations of the Dynamic Model
No Uncertainty Benchmark Uncertainty High Uncertainty
Ages Worka Claimingb Work Claiming Work Claiming
Scenario 1: Lower Interest on Savings
Age 60 70.12% | 67.99% | 66.74% |
Age 61 70.52% | 67.85% | 66.21% |
Age 62 54.78% 47.14% 49.85% 51.02% 47.11% 53.34%
Age 63 36.03% 21.02% 35.58% 23.08% 35.79% 23.58%
Age 64 41.41% 11.92% 44.96% 12.92% 46.38% 12.43%
Age 65 51.21% 17.6% 55.75% 11.87% 56.47% 9.84%
Age 66 66.71% 2.31% 66.07% 1.1% 64.39% 0.81%
Age 67 67.66% 0% 65.6% 0% 63.06% 0%
Scenario 2: 10% Decline in Wealth
Age 60 74.06% | 72.12% | 70.45% |
Age 61 75.13% | 72.05% | 70.20% |
Age 62 37.32% 76.5% 36.36% 76.62% 36.54% 75.95%
Age 63 47.15% 22.77% 45.45% 22.9% 43.84% 23.52%
Age 64 68.16% 0.7% 66.2% 0.44% 64.78% 0.49%
Age 65 69.23% 0.01% 67.07% 0.03% 65.61% 0.02%
Age 66 69% 0% 67.37% 0% 65.32% 0%
Age 67 69.04% 0% 67.24% 0% 65.03% 0%
Scenario 3: 20% Decline in Wealth
Age 60 78.73% | 76.19% | 74.36% |
Age 61 77.78% | 74.64% | 72.78% |
Age 62 42.88% 81.98% 42.85% 81.78% 42.82% 81.99%
Age 63 52.09% 17.5% 49.85% 17.94% 49.13% 17.7%
Age 64 68.30% 0.5% 66.35% 0.2% 64.94% 0.28%
Age 65 69.25% 0% 67.09% 0.01% 65.64% 0.01%
Age 66 68.99% 0% 67.35% 0% 65.29% 0%
Age 67 69.08% 0% 67.36% 0% 65.16% 0%
Notes: aAs percentage of survivors. bFirst Claimers at that age, and as percentage of the total who ever claimed.
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